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Statutory Interpretation 
and the Public Interest 
by Zacharia Nethercot* 
This article argues that judges should apply a "public interest" 
standard when exercising their discretion in interpreting statutes. This 
standard provides judges sufficient guidance, yet, more than other stan-
dards, allows their decisions to take into account both the public will 
and additional protections for underrepresented populations. In this way, 
the judge will arrive at the most legitimate decision possible. 
Section I explores the limits of judicial discretion within which such 
a standard could operate. In Section II, the author fits "public interest" 
into the context of the judiciary's role in democratic theory. Section III 
outlines some progressive concepts useful in defining the "public inter-
est." Two California cases examined in Section IV illustrate how the 
standard can be applied to statutory interpretation problems. Finally, in 
Section V, the author demonstrates how a "public interest" standard 
can strengthen protection for the rights of women and other 
underrepresented people. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many legal theorists have attempted to explain what legitimizes the 
exercise of judicial authority, and/or how judges should make decisions. 
In this article, I will argue that judges should, within the constraints of 
their power, interpret statutes to best serve the public interest. The "public 
interest" principle can be contrasted to theories such as Justice Scalia's 
"textualism," Ronald Dworkin's "fit," or Judge Bork's "neutral princi-
ples."l 
* Zacharia Nethercot, B.A. History, 1981, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1992, 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law. This article was originally de-
livered as a paper for Professor Eileen Scallen's seminar, Contemporary Issues in 
Legal Interpretation. I would like to thank Professor Scallen for the opportunity to 
develop these ideas, and the staff of WU for their. help in revising and expanding 
this article. 
1. Trying to summarize these viewpoints in three sentences or so can only do a 
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Scalia, Dworkin, Bork, and many other legal theorists appear to base 
their theories on assumptions something like these: 
1. Judges are unelected or purposely insulated from the democrat-
ic process, so they are presumptively unrepresentative of popular 
opinion. 
2. In order to exercise power legitimately judges must avoid 
relying upon their own subjective opinions. 
3. Something (the theorists disagree about what) serves or should 
serve as a constraint on judges using their subjective opinions. 
These constraints legitimize the exercise of power because the 
judge's actions are constrained by some external force rather than 
her own subjective opinion. 
Critics such as Stanley Fish argue that this paradigm is flawed be-
cause there is no such thing as a true objective standard against which a 
judge may measure her opinion. Precedent, text, and other external mat-
ters can be understood only through interpretation and therefore do not 
provide theoretical constraints on judges. If judges are constrained by pre-
cedent, the constraint is self-imposed and therefore subjective. Since there 
are no truly objective constraints, the judge must search elsewhere for 
legitimacy for the exercise of her power.2 
My approach is to recognize these criticisms and attempt to build a 
model of judicial decision-making that can be justified as being, if not 
legitimate per se, at least the most legitimate model possible under the 
circumstances. I believe that developing and following a public interest 
model of statutory interpretation is an effective method for increasing 
judicial legitimacy. 
I limit my argument for a public interest standard in statutory inter-
pretation to those areas within a judge's discretion. In Part I, I examine 
where those areas of discretion lie. Theoreticians disagree about what is 
or is not discretionary. Dworkin, for example, argues that for every legal 
question there is theoretically a correct answer, and it is up to the judge 
to try to find that answer. Dworkin would deny the judge any discretion, 
granting her only the ability to make good faith mistakes. H. L. A. Hart, 
representing positivism, might look at the discretionary area as where the 
law runs out, requiring the judge to legislate from the bench. Discretion 
might also arise from the "hard" cases where there are equally plausible 
arguments on both sides. 
I will use "discretionary" in a practical manner, to denote the areas 
where a judge's opinion will be accepted as the law governing the case. 
disservice to the authors cited, and for this I ask their forgiveness. 
2. See, e.g., Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1325 (1984). 
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To understand the extent of these discretionary areas, it is important fltst 
to understand the external, power-based constraints on judging. 
A potential weakness of a public interest model of statutory interpre-
tation is that the concept may be too vague to provide conclusive answers 
in difficult cases. In Part IT, I will argue that the public interest concept 
can be meaningful when put into context. In particular, I will examine the 
relationship between the public interest and the judicial role in democratic 
theory. I will argue that a theory of democracy based on consent (as 
opposed to majority will) provides a strong rationale for the exercise of 
judicial power, especially when that power is exercised to protect or build 
the consent of the governed. The fear that the interpretation of statutes in 
the public interest will lead to an overly vague standard is thus addressed, 
at least in part, by understanding the judiciary's role as a democratic 
institution. 
Even if public interest is not a fatally vague concept, ascertaining 
what the public interest is can still lead to difficult political and ideologi-
cal questions. In Part ill, I will posit some progressive concepts that can 
be useful in ascertaining the public interest. These concepts can be seen, 
in light of the democratic theory discussed in Part IT, as "consent maxi-
mizers." The judiciary, by using these concepts in discretionary decisions, 
can help to improve the functioning of our far-from-perfect democracy. 
Thus, I argue that the judiciary should answer "political" questions by 
taking a progressive viewpoint, seeking to use government and the law as 
a way to make the world a better place for society as a whole and for 
future generations. By doing so, the judiciary will be exercising power in 
the most legitimate fashion possible. 
In Part IV, I will use two California cases (one "good," one "bad") to 
illustrate how courts can use the concept of public interest in statutory 
interpretation. One case achieves beneficial results by relying on a sound 
conception of the public interest. The other case ignores the concept of 
the public interest, leading to absurd and detrimental results. 
Finally, In Part V, I use a third California case to demonstrate how a 
public interest standard for statutory interpretation is compatible with the 
need to remedy the historical discrimination faced by women in the legal 
system. I argue that a broad, comprehensive theory, such as the public 
interest, can provide even more protection to women than a narrower 
focus on strictly gender-based laws prohibiting discrimination. 
METHODOLOGY 
My goal is to construct a theory of statutory interpretation and invite 
criticism of the construct I present. However, in discussions with readers 
of the fltst draft of this paper it became clear that without a minimum 
knowledge of some of the theoretical debates and issues the reader would 
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fmd the paper difficult to understand. Therefore I have chosen some 
examples of other prominent theories of statutory interpretation to provide 
context. It is not my purpose in this article to critique particular theorists 
in detail, nor to summarize their theoretical constructs. 
My concerns over methodology have led me to adopt a 
non-traditional approach toward citations and footnotes. Citations to "au-
thority" in a scholarly discussion of an issue do not necessarily advance 
knowledge about the issue examined. I perceive a variety of misconcep-
tions and problems in citing to authority. First, just because somebody 
has said something does not make it true. Second, the fact that somebody 
may have said something that an author is saying now does not make 
what the author is saying any less her own thoughts on the matter. Final-
ly, because of a history of exclusion of women and minorities from the 
legal profession, citations to "authority" most likely means citations to 
white, male "authority." This has the unfortunate consequence of perpetu-
ating male-dominated legal theory. 
Law journal format many times discourages the expression of both 
innovative and common sense ideas by requiring citation to relevant 
"authority." Innovative reasoning must by definition require an appeal to 
the reader as authority. If there was any "authority" the reasoning would 
not be innovative. Common sense reasoning can usually fmd "authority" 
to cite. However, by definition, common sense relies on the proposition 
that "anybody [reasonable person] who thought about it would think so." 
Therefore, the critical authority is once again the reader. 
On this basis, the main authority I appeal to in this article is the 
reader. If the concepts put forward make "sense" to the reader and help 
to develop clarity of thought on the matters discussed, then my statements 
are validated by the only authority with which I am concerned. 
My footnotes are thus limited to references that I believe may be of 
use to the reader. The footnotes refer either to works I know about that 
cover areas I cannot fully develop in this article or to pieces that will 
give the reader a chance to make her own assessment of the facts of the 
matter discussed. I will also cite the works of authors whose concepts I 
attack, so that the reader may determine whether my reasoning is more 
persuasive. The reader is given the chance to avoid the difficulty of los-
ing her place in the text because there is nothing in the footnotes other 
than suggested additional readings and "if you don't believe me, read it 
for yourself' citations. 
To help those who wish to pursue particular legal theories further, I 
have included a selected bibliography. The bibliography may also help 
provide context for those who want one-sentence summaries of various 
schools of theory to provide a context for understanding this article. 
"""-:-.:7',:.~« <~<---......-~~;'- ... 
• ,,_. v' " _ . "".~ 
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I. POWER-BASED CONSTRAINTS ON 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
127 
Because my argument for adopting a public interest standard refers to 
its benefits when used within the discretionary power of the judge, it is 
important to determine what constrains the ability of a judge to interpret 
statutes. Here I am referring to specific, external restraints that compel 
judges to act in ways they might not otherwise act. It is important to 
recognize and understand these constraints on power, because they func-
tion quite differently for a Supreme Court justice than for a trial court 
judge. 
Three major constraints on a judge's ability to interpret statutes are: 
higher authority, limits on time, and limits on information. These con-
straints are interrelated. Higher authority refers to a person or group who 
can either remove a judge from power and replace her, or make the 
judge's exercise of interpretation futile by reversing that interpretation. 
Additionally, a higher authority may have the ability to promote (increase 
the power of) the judge. A judge dedicated to serving the public interest 
must balance the need to interpret statutes in the public interest against 
the benefits of occupying a position of higher power. 
Lower courts are thus constrained by the knowledge that a particular 
ruling would most likely be overturned by the higher courts and therefore 
would be futile. Additionally, many lower-court judges are elected or 
removable by impeachment. The group able to remove a lower-court 
judge should also be considered higher authority. The high courts are 
constrained by threat of removal and the possibility that an order may not 
be enforced by the executive branch. 
Limits on time force judges to consider where their energy would 
best be spent. A forceful, well-thought-out opinion is futile if it is over-
turned. Thus, in allocating time a judge should balance the possibility of 
being overturned against the possibility of spending time on an area 
where there is greater likelihood of an interpretation being accepted. In a 
similar fashion, a high-court judge should consider the possibility of leg-
islative action that reverses an interpretation (a court could ignore the leg-
islature, but in doing so risks removal). 
Limits on information are, in modem jurisprudence, directly related to 
limits on time. There are often so many cases and articles potentially 
related to an issue that a judge could not read them all and still reach a 
timely decision. In considering procedural motions a judge may need to 
limit her time, and consequently the amount of information considered; 
however, gathering information is critical for a judge to accomplish her 
goals in interpreting statutes. The particular information a judge uses can 
have a major impact on her interpretation. Although external limits on 
hi 
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infonnation exist (e.g. national security issues), the main limit on infor-
mation is how much time a judge has to seek out the infonnation avail-
able. 
These three constraints are, in practice, quite substantial. Removal 
may be exercised for failure to meet expectations. People may expect 
judges to act like "judges" as defmed by tradition and the legal communi-
ty. Heeding tradition is in this way responding to higher authority. Tradi-
tion and precedent are not, however, the sole touchstones of expectations. 
The California Supreme Court's experience with issues surrounding 
the death penalty illustrates powerfully the need for judges to understand 
the question of higher authority. Three members of the court (Bird, 
Grodin and Reynoso) failed to be reconfinned by California voters pri-
marily because of their failure to rapidly implement the death penalty au-
thorized by voter initiative. 
Ronald Dworkin might argue that the task of the California Supreme 
Court would be to come to decisions that achieve the best "fit." This "fit" 
would be based on the relevant statutes, precedents, and constitutional 
precepts, as well as the principles behind them. The facts of the case 
would be fit, like a jigsaw puzzle piece, into this pre-existing framework. 
In this way, the court would attempt to achieve a consistent and meaning-
ful body of interpretive law. 
The California court in many ways followed Dworkin's model. They 
attempted to fit the death penalty initiative into the body of California 
and United States jurisprudence. Achieving "fit" was no simple task in 
light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Geor-
gia,3 in which each justice wrote a separate opinion on the constitution-
ality of the death penalty. The attempt to achieve "fit" was, by the ac-
count of Justice Grodin, a good-faith effort. But this did not save the 
justices from the wrath of the voters, who wanted murderers put to death 
immediately. 
In this situation, the court was faced with two distinct higher authori-
ties: the U.S. Supreme Court and the California voters. One wielded the 
power of declaring the initiative unconstitutional, rendering the California 
court's interpretation futile. The other wielded the power of voting the 
justices out of office. Using a power-based analysis, the court might have 
been better advised to write an opinion it believed would be overturned 
than to face removal. Justice Grodin argued powerfully for the indepen-
dence of the judiciary, the need to allow justices to hear arguments and 
come to reasoned conclusions without considering possible election re-
sults. But the voters either did not hear or did not accept these argu-
ments. 
3. Funnan v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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Justice Grodin was acting in his well-reasoned judgment of the public 
interest (following a model that resembles Dworkin's "fit"). This judg-
ment ran up against the constraints of power, however, and he was voted 
out of office." This illustrates the difficulty of following a theory of in-
terpretation that does not account for the constraints of power and why I 
limit my argument herein to discretionary decisions of judges. What is 
discretionary must be developed in each specific context based on the 
existence of external, power-based constraints. 
n. THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
A broad concept such as the public interest, if not further dermed, is 
open to the charge that judicial determinations will be based on the per-
sonal value preferences of individual judges instead of the democratic 
body politic. It is important that the judicial process be subjected to dem-
ocratic control. However, the notion of democratic control is not inherent-
ly in conflict with the public interest standard. 
To explain why, I begin this section with a general discussion of the 
notion of objectivity and the ways in which objectivity fits into democrat-
ic theory. I then discuss democratic theory and the problems in adducing 
and providing expression for the individual, minority and majority percep-
tions that compose the public interest. Because of these problems, it is 
necessary to examine democratic delegation theory and separation of 
powers as ways to implement the public interest in the democratic pro-
cess, particularly in questions of statutory interpretation. Finally, I discuss 
the implications for determining the public interest in a system of unequal 
distribution of information and wealth. Given the inequities in our system 
and the need to build consent in order to improve democracy, I conclude 
that judges can help ensure that the most disempowered in our society are 
included in the democratic process by applying a public interest standard 
when exercising their discretion in interpreting statutes. 
Legal theorists such as Robert Bork might argue that a public interest 
standard is too subjective, and that interpretations should be based on 
more "objective" or "neutral" principles. The problem with this argument 
is that objectivity and neutrality are not only unattainable chimeras, but 
they can also serve as shibboleths, distinguishing those who share in the 
alleged "objective" belief from those who do not share the "objective" 
position. 
Judges can, however, determine contextual objectivity, which can be 
4. Interview with Joseph R. Grodin, Fonner Justice of the California Supreme 
Court, Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law (Nov. 
29, 1990); JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PuRSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SU-
PREME COURT JUSTICE (1989). 
I} • 
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dermed as consensus within the context. The concept of contextual objec-
tivity recognizes that within certain historical periods, those individuals in 
a society who exercise political power agree that certain beliefs are objec-
tively true. For instance, eight of the nine Justices on the United States 
Supreme Court of the late 1800's believed that "objectively," the Four-
teenth Amendment did not prohibit "separate but equal" schools for 
blacks and whites.s Today, it is well settled that "separate but equal" 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. This change in jurisprudential posi-
tion does not make the concept of "equal protection" too subjective to be 
useful. Instead, it indicates the significance of the context that underlies 
and validates our current constitutional interpretation. 
Underlying the socio-historical context of any judicial determination 
of "objective truth" is a particular set of preferences. The underlying and 
more important issues of statutory interpretation are whose preferences 
should govern an interpretation and how those preferences are deter-
mined. Somebody's or some group's preferences are always embodied in 
the law. In Plessey v. Ferguson, for example, the white majority's prefer-
ence for racial separation determined the "objective truth" that separate 
education based on race did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Relying on precedent or other so-called "neutral" principles does not 
allow a judge to avoid the issue of preferences. Why should a judge base 
her decision on what a past judge wrote in an opinion about a similar 
issue? Why should a judge base her decision on the preferences of the 
writer of a legislative committee report? These are not inherently "neu-
tral" principles. Some set of preferences underlie these choices. 
By referring to a public interest standard, however, these questions 
about the use of precedent can be better answered. Generally there are 
good reasons for a judge to consider precedent. The presumption is that 
the previous judge carefully considered the issue and came to a 
well-reasoned decision based on the information available. In addition, 
there is a strong public interest in maintaining a stable legal system. 
I argue for a complex democratic theory that recognizes the value of 
precedent, but does not follow it blindly. Instead, and more significantly, 
this complex democratic theory would rely on the concept of the public 
interest to guide it in statutory interpretation. The public interest can best 
be understood within the context of democratic theory. Because democrat-
ic theory is based on letting the body politic decide, a concept of the 
public interest based on democratic theory can be objective within the 
context of the body politic. This is a much larger context than past judges 
who wrote judicial opinions. Thus, Judge Bork's alleged "neutral princi-
5. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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ples,"6 such as precedent or "original intent," are neither more objective 
nor more useful than the public interest standard in attaining the goal of 
democracy. 
Democratic theory posits that people know best what is good for 
themselves. The proof adduced is usually that nobody has yet come up 
with a better system. The caveat "when fully informed" is many times 
added, particularly when complex decisions involving long-term conse-
quences are involved, as illustrated by some Latin American countries' 
experiences with hyperinflation. In these countries, had each person been 
"fully informed," it is most likely that they would have voted for differ-
ent policies. Democratic theory can take this information gap into ac-
count. The main point is that ascertaining the public interest involves 
finding out what the people think is best (the "popular will"). 
Problems are encountered in ascertaining the "popular will." The 
basic problem is aggregating "will," especially because thoughts are based 
on information, which, if unavailable, may make the thought an inaccu-
rate reflection of a person's "will." A complex democratic theory rec-
ognizes that any democratic process results in only an approximation of 
the public will. The success of a democracy can be determined by how 
close an approximation the process achieves. 
A simplistic majoritarian theory dictates that a majority vote would 
always be the best approximation of the public will. However, such a 
theory is subject to serious criticism. The basic criticism of majoritarian 
democratic theory is that it carries the seeds of its own destruction. Noth-
ing prevents the majority from voting to strip the minority of voting 
rights (this was a major problem in the French Revolution). 
A more complex majoritarian theory would take this into account and 
put such majority decisions out of bounds through constitutional 
protections requiring super-majority (i.e. two-thirds) votes for some deci-
sions. This might be justified by distinguishing the concept of "tempo-
rary" majorities. The argument would be that over time, a majority would 
not support the action, and the super-majority vote is required to protect 
the majority over time from the majority of the moment. 
Another brand of democratic theory starts from consent, or attaining 
the consensus of the democratic body politic. The Declaration of Indepen-
dence is a powerful statement of consent theory. The Constitution's pre-
amble, as well as the Bill of Rights, reflects a strong base in consent 
theory. Consent theory begins with the proposition that unanimous deci-
sions are the best approximation of the popular will. However, because 
unanimity is seldom if ever possible, but some government action would 
be better than none, people must consent to some decisions they would 
6. ROBERT BoRK, THE 1'EMPTINo OF AMERICA (1990). 
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not have made by themselves. If the system as a whole is better than 
viable alternatives, then there is in some sense consent to an adverse 
decision. But if someone believes that her fundamental rights are violated 
by a decision, then the consent of that person no longer exists. The body 
politic has the choice of recognizing that right or becoming a smaller and 
less valid body. 
Consent theory runs into some difficulty in dealing with crime and 
punishment. It is difficult to argue that criminals consent to their punish-
ment. Arguments may be made that some type of pre- or post-punishment 
consent exists, but this leads into convenient fictions. Alternatively, crime 
can be understood as an attempt by the purported criminal to destroy the 
consent of another member of the body politic. Punishment of the crim-
inal which results in the body politic becoming smaller does not make the 
body less valid, because growing smaller in the situation was inevitable. 
This analysis leads to a balance of consents, such as the right of the 
victim to live versus the right of the killer to act unfettered by societal 
norms. In striking this balance we may factor in the completely extin-
guished consent of the victim, as well as the partially extinguished con-
sent of those who operate out of fear when dealing with the killer, and 
conclude that punishing murder may well save as much consent as possi-
ble. Because punishment always destroys some consent, however, a con-
cern for procedural protections for criminal defendants is consistent with 
consent theory, as is the rule of construing criminal statutes narrowly. 
Criminalizing abortion, on the other hand, would not be consistent 
with consent theory. It would destroy the consent to the system of all 
those pregnant women who believed that they had a fundamental right to 
control when and whether they would bear children. Yet such a law 
would not save enough consent to offset the loss of consent suffered by 
these women. It is difficult to argue that a fetus can have meaningful 
thought that could be considered consent. Even granting such consent, 
criminalizing abortion could not increase consent within the system be-
cause no one else could possibly fear that they would be aborted. Con-
sent theory would thus distinguish abortion from murder. 
"Public choice" theory bears mention here, although properly viewed 
it is not a theory of democracy at all. "Public choice" theory examines 
the interaction between the strength of various group interests and deci-
sions of legislatures. "Public choice" theory has demonstrated effectively 
that decisions of the legislature do not represent the choice of the majori-
ty of voters as much as the choice of those groups that apply the most 
pressure on a particular issue. "Public choice" theory is thus very helpful 
in analyzing the quality of our current governmental system. However, 
there is little, if anything, normative to be gained from "public choice" 
theory. The normative argument for "public choice" theory is, at best, 
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that since this is the way things are done, this is the way things should 
be done. At worst, the argument is that protecting the powerful is a 
worthwhile goal. 
Neither majoritarian nor consent theories seem completely satisfacto-
ry. However, the goal of total consent is the more appealing of the two. 
Progressive theory would recognize the goal of total consent as an unob-
tainable perfection, but still pursue the goal as a means to improve the 
current governmental system. 
Both majoritarian and consent theories have historically had to con-
front the issues of best approximation, delegation, and representative 
democracy. In ancient Athens, it was possible to call all the citizens 
together to debate and pass laws. From a practical standpoint, this is not 
possible in modem democracies. There are just too many people to get 
everybody together in one place. Thus, modem democracies have had to 
elect representatives to approximate how the majority of people would 
have voted. However, such systems of representative democracy have 
always been flawed by the corruption, lies and misrepresentations of at 
least some of the representatives. Constitutional systems can be seen as at 
least a partial response to the need to control such abuses. How well a 
system controls abuses can have a major impact on how closely that 
system approximates what all citizens would have decided, had that been 
possible. 
With the telecommunications revolution, we have reached a stage 
where instantaneous public reaction could be had for every governmental 
decision, whether "judicial," "legislative," or "executive." Voting by two-
way cable television is certainly within technological capability. Issues of 
statutory interpretation could be decided by such a vote. (A similar idea 
would have judges consult polls as authority for a statutory interpreta-
tion.) While such ideas are most likely beyond the established power 
constraints in our governmental system and thus impracticable, they bear 
discussing as illustrations of the need for a complex democratic theory 
that includes delegation theory. 
Democratic delegation theory can be based on the realization that no 
single person has the time or information available to decide every issue 
adequately, even if she had the desire to do so. This is true regardless of 
technological advancements. In effect, a system of decision-making by 
two-way cable voting would mean that people who did not have time to 
participate would not be represented at all. Decisions would be made 
mostly by retired people and the unemployed. The need to delegate deci-
sions is therefore essential to a functioning democracy. 
Systems of elected representatives and separation of powers are justi-
fied in democratic theory because they provide the best approximation of 
the popular will. The popular will becomes not just an aggregate of popu-
tM 
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lar impression derivable from poll results, but the will of the people 
properly informed and adequately deliberating. This by nature must be 
constructed. A legislature or a court may be able to give us the best 
expression of this will. Therefore, delegation of authority by the people is 
in this way not just a necessary evil, but can have a positive value for 
improving democracy. The basic problem with delegation is the need for 
trust in the decision-makers. This problem is best solved by supporting 
officials who work hardest to implement the public interest. One way for 
a delegator to determine whom to trust is to examine the potential deci-
sion-maker's positions on issues with which the delegator is familiar. If 
the position and reasoning are persuasive, then there is good reason to 
believe that the same type of reasoning will be used to achieve satisfacto-
ry positions on issues with which the delegator is unfamiliar. 
Separation of powers can be justified under delegation theory by the 
need for specialization. Consideration of consent theory in conjunction 
with delegation also serves to further develop our understanding of the 
role of separation of powers in our governmental system. Consent theory 
posits that consent to a system is partly based on that system's fair and 
equal treatment of all people. Many decisions must be made by majority 
vote. However, procedures that ensure equal treatment of minorities in-
crease consent and thus promote better democracy. The legislature, being 
subject immediately to the will of the majority, may be more concerned 
with protecting the majority than with the consent of minority interests. 
Separation of "judicial" from "legislative" is therefore particularly im-
portant to ensuring fair and equal treatment. 
The judiciary is purposely insulated from the will of the majority, the 
better to check and balance the tendency of the legislature to cater to the 
majority. Separation of powers theory leads to the conclusion that the 
judiciary is fulfilling its most essential role in protecting the interests of 
the least powerful minorities. In interpreting statutes, the judiciary plays 
an important role in helping legislation better approximate the "public 
will" than might be developed by simple majority vote. 
Two models of the relationship between the judiciary and the legisla-
ture may be put forward in regard to statutory interpretation. In one, the 
people delegate authority to the legislature, which then delegates authority 
to the judiciary by passing laws. In the second, the people delegate cer-
tain powers to the legislature and other powers to the jUdiciary. The two 
methods are graphically illustrated as follows: 
136 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:1 
tion arises in situations in which the enacting legislature engaged in a 
serious consideration of the issue and thus, more than anybody else, 
based its decision on the most information available. In this way, the 
presumption would be that the intent expressed was the best approxima-
tion of the "public will" and thus the public interest. Yet when the legis-
lature did not engage in a serious consideration of an issue at the time, 
there is no reason to believe that the "public will" will be approximated 
well - let alone in the best fashion possible - through "imaginative 
construction. " 
Additionally, Posner has already assumed that the legislature accurate-
ly reflected the will of the people and that this will has not evolved or 
changed over time. If a judge's goal is to have her interpretation reflect 
the current public interest, Posner's method will be a worse approxima-
tion than if she were to "imaginatively construct" the intent of the current 
legislature. If the judge constructs anything, she should construct the 
public interest directly, as the fundamental purpose of the legislature is to 
represent the people. Thus, Posner's "imaginative reconstruction" is less 
democratic than alternative methods based on the second model. 
Under the second model, the power to interpret statutes is delegated 
directly to the judiciary. This model can be either conservative or pro-
gressive, depending on the purpose of the direct delegation. Scalia's 
textualism would fit into the second model, as he might argue that the 
courts should act only when given a clear command by the text of a 
statute and not attempt to ascertain any hidden or implied intent of the 
legislature. This theory limits the ability of the judiciary to serve the 
interests of the legislature or the people by making judicial action more 
difficult. 
A public interest model would see the direct delegation of power to 
the judiciary as designed partly to protect minorities from unfair enforce-
ment and partly to ascertain the public will on a matter that was not fully 
or clearly expressed by the statute. Under this version of the second 
model, the judiciary's duty would be to best serve the people. Legislative 
intent would be important, as it would presumably be the best available 
reflection of the popular will, but the judiciary would have an additional 
duty to ensure that the law is fairly enforced and enforceable. Under the 
flt'St model, once a law was passed, it would not matter how unfair or 
discriminatory an interpretation of the law would be, as long as that was 
what the legislature intended. Under the second model, a law reinstituting 
slavery, for example, could be declared void as contrary to public inter-
est, as it violates fundamental rights and destroys consent, even absent a 
written constitution. 
In applying democratic theory to statutory interpretation in the United 
States, it is important to emphasize that the United States is far from a 
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The vertical delegation model would make the judiciary the servant of 
the legislature, responsive only to the command of a majority of the 
legislature. The judiciary would have no independent duty to the people 
except as required by specific constitutional clauses. Since each statute 
would be a discrete delegation of power, questions of interpretation 
would best be answered by looking to the intent of the legislature that 
passed the statute. The model is conservative in that the intent behind a 
statute will not be able to change with the change of context over time. 
The problem with the first model is that it adopts uncritically the 
presumption that the popular will is most accurately reflected by the 
legislature that enacts the statute to be interpreted. This presumption leads 
to the conclusion that the intent of the enacting legislature should be the 
guiding principle of statutory interpretation. Judge Posner takes this rea-
soning a step further and argues that when the intent of the enacting 
legislature cannot be adequately ascertained (i.e. because the issue did not 
exist at the time), judges should "imaginatively reconstruct" the intent of 
that legislature. The court would try to imagine what the enacting legisla-
ture would intend if it were in session at the time of the interpretation. 7 
The mistake here is that the presumption in favor of the enacting 
legislature loses all its purported force when it is clear that the enacting 
legislature did not contemplate an eventuality. Since Posner would "imag-
inatively reconstruct" the intent of the enacting legislature, he would 
achieve only an approximation of that intent. The force of the presump-
7. RICHARD A. PoSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 
(1988). 
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perfect democracy, especially a consent-based democracy. Much govern-
mental structure was developed at a time when women and minorities 
were disenfranchised. In addition, property requirements and literacy tests 
prevented poor people's voices from being heard in the development of 
many of our laws. 
An examination of our current democracy under consent theory shows 
that the power of wealth greatly diminishes the quality of the approxima-
tion of the public will by our legislatures. In an ideal democracy each 
will must be given equal weight and properly be taken into account. 
People's electoral choices are, however, by necessity determined by the 
information they receive. Currently, the information received depends on 
which candidate can raise the most money. Additionally, electoral rules 
do not create incentives for informed and comprehensive deb~te of issues. 
Finally, the U.S. education system almost completely fails to teach people 
how to make intelligent electoral choices. The result of these democratic 
inadequacies is that the least powerful (fmancially and educationally) tend 
to be the worst represented by the current democratic process. Judges, by 
interpreting statutes in ways that empower the least powerful, can work to 
improve the functioning of the democracy and better serve the public 
interest. 
III. ASCERTAINING THE PUBLIC INTEREST: 
SOME PROGRESSIVE CONCEPTS 
As developed in Part IT, the judiciary can help make the system more 
democratic by using a consent-based model of democracy to help defme 
the public interest for use in interpreting statutes. By taking this progres-
sive approach, the judiciary can increase the legitimacy of its exercise of 
power. Instrumental progressive concepts can be validated by determining 
whether they ,move society toward the goal of maximum consent. 
I propose the use of these progressive concepts: "empowerment," 
"human potential," "self-esteem," "respect for the value of diversity," and, 
above all, a willingness to critically question tradition in order to find 
ways to improve the functioning of society. Progressive thinking general-
ly keeps one eye on the present and the other on the future, using the 
past to illuminate the road to the future. The concepts presented herein 
are in no way meant to be exclusive. They are, however, meant to pro-
vide a broad framework that is generally compatible with progressive 
thinking and additional progressive concepts. 
"Empowerment" involves teaching, organizing, and providing tools to 
people so they can gain more control over the decisions (by both business 
and government) that affect the quality of their lives. As people gain 
equal power within the constraints of their potential, the representative 
quality of a democracy is increased. Class actions are a good example of 
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how the courts can empower the people. Rules of court that make In Pro 
Per representation easier also empower people. 
Empowerment is always a relative inquiry. People in power do not 
need empowerment. Empowerment exists only to the extent that it fosters 
equality within the constraints of "human potential." Actions that appear 
to be empowering but that are not directed toward creating equality may 
instead create unfair advantage. 
Striving for certainty in legal interpretation should not be seen as an 
argument against adopting a public interest standard in statutory interpre-
tation. Certainty fmds a comfortable place under the banner of empower-
ment. Certainty can provide "notice" to people, and thus empower them. 
Certainty can also provide more efficient dispute resolution, thus allowing 
fuller development of human potential with the time saved by the parties 
to a dispute. However, certainty that the application of the law will deny 
relief to a party who has by general consensus been unjustly harmed is 
not a worthwhile goal. Certainty must therefore be weighed with regard 
to the overall public interest and empowerment. 
"Human potential" involves the realization of the inherent potential of 
each individual through the individual's participation in society. Maximiz-
ing human potential is a powerful tool for improving the quality of our 
democracy by increasing the quality of consent. "Self-esteem" (known as 
"pride" in the lesbian and gay community) is necessary to achieve full 
human potential. Self-esteem involves people believing in their inherent 
worth and their ability to participate valuably in society. Invidious dis-
crimination destroys self-esteem. The judiciary thus has good reason to 
actively interpret statutes to prevent invidious discrimination, thereby 
serving the public interest by increasing human potential. 
"Respect for the value of diversity" ("diversity" for short) involves 
recognizing and accepting that which is unique in human beings. "Diver-
sity" is in itself an important value because diversity increases the infor-
mation available by increasing the viewpoints presenting information. 
Condemning people simply for being different destroys the human poten-
tial for progress. Respect for diversity requires that there be valid reasons 
- free from unfair prejudice or stereotyping - for disagreeing with a 
viewpoint. A problem arises in accepting or respecting viewpoints that 
argue for intolerance, because such viewpoints are designed to destroy 
diversity. Like the question of balancing consent for the purpose of 
criminal law, respect for diversity requires some balancing when faced 
with intolerant viewpoints. 
Respect for "human dignity" involves the realization that society and 
civilization are improved when people are treated so as to achieve their 
full human potential. All human beings have dignity which must be pro-
tected. Even if a person has lost much of her dignity through the vicissi-
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tudes of life, whatever dignity that remains should be fostered and pro-
tected. Protecting human dignity is a critical role for the courts, as this is 
not a value that receives adequate attention in a majoritarian system. 
Therefore, when interpreting statutes that affect the poor and powerless, 
courts are well advised to give these statutes a broad, liberal construction. 
There is certainly room for debate and discussion within the context 
of these "progressive" concepts (and these are not exclusive), but these 
concepts can form useful guideposts when heading toward a more specif-
ic inquiry into what is or is not in the public interest. 
IV. CASE STUDmS: RIGHT AND WRONG 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS 
I have chosen two cases as examples of how courts can use the con-
cept of the public interest in statutory interpretation. Both are recent 
California decisions, one by the California Supreme Court, the other by 
the California Court of Appeal, First District. First, I argue that Justice 
Tobriner, writing for a unanimous California Supreme Court in 1970, 
decided In re Cox8 correctly, using principles consistent with the public 
interest. Making those principles more explicit helps to further illuminate 
why the case was properly decided. Second, I argue that Judge Smith, 
writing for a 2-1 majority on a state court of appeal in 1987, decided 
Anderson v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. 9 incor-
rectly, ignoring a relevant inquiry into the public interest and instead re-
lying on highly questionable traditional tools of statutory interpretation. 
Cox confronted questions of the interpretation of the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act. 10 At the time the case was decided, the Act stated: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and 
equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry or 
national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business estab-
lishments of every kind whatsoever. 
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or 
privilege on a person which is conditioned or limited by law or 
which is applicable alike to persons of every race, color, religion, 
ancestry or national origin. 
Mr. Cox was arrested at a shopping center in San Rafael for refusing to 
leave when he was ordered to do so by a security guard. Mr. Cox 
8. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205 (1970). 
9. Anderson v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd., 192 Cal. App. 
3d 1336 (1987). 
10. The Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal Civ. Code §51 (West 1988). 
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claimed that he was a paying customer and was being discriminated 
against because of his association at the shopping center with a friend 
who had long hair, unconventional dress, and unpopular political beliefs. 
The question for the court was whether the Unruh Act covered such 
discrimination. 
Traditional rules of statutory interpretation might have led the court 
astray. In particular, the "plain meaning" rule and the rule of expressio 
unius might have led the court to decide that the type of discrimination 
Cox complained of was not covered by the Act. The plain meaning rule 
is described by a well-known hornbook this way: "If the words of an 
enactment, given their ordinary and proper meaning, are reasonably free 
from ambiguity and uncertainty, the courts will look no further to ascer-
tain the legislative intent."ll The rule of expressio unius, according to 
the same hornbook, is that "the expression of certain things in a statute 
necessarily involves exclusion of other things not expressed.,,12 
The court might have reasoned that the list of prohibited discrimina-
tion was exclusive and that this was the "plain meaning" of the statute. 
Justice Tobriner, however, did not follow this reasoning. 
The court looked first to the history of the Unruh Act. The Unruh 
Act was passed as an amendment to the former code section that codified 
the common-law duties of common carriers and innkeepers, including the 
duty to serve all paying customers. In 1923, the legislature extended the 
Act to cover "places where ice cream or soft drinks of any kind are sold 
for consumption on the premises." Under the 1923 version, Cox most 
likely would have been covered. The court held in Stoumen v. Reilly 
(1951)13 that the 1923 version covered discrimination against homosexu-
als. In Cox, the court reasoned: 
The Legislature enacted the 1959 amendment subsequent to 
our decisions in Orloff and Stoumen. Neither of those cases re-
stricted discrimination to "race, color, religion, ancestry or nation-
al origin" - the particular incidents of discrimination specified in 
the 1959 amendment. We must, of course, presume that the Leg-
islature was well aware of these decisions. We cannot infer from 
the 1959 amendment any legislative intent to deprive citizens in 
general of the rights declared by the statute and stanchioned by 
public policy. "Without the most cogent and convincing evidence, 
a court will never attribute to the Legislature the intent to disre-
gard or overturn a sound rule of public policy." Although we rec-
ognize that a Legislature that contemplated civil rights legislation 
11. 58 Cal. Jur. 3d, Statutes § 102. 
12. [d. Statutes § 115. 
13. Sol M. Stoumen v. George R. Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713 (1951). 
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in the late 1950's or early 1960's would have been particularly 
concerned with the plight of racial minorities within the United 
States, the prosecution has not presented one shred of legislative 
history which would suggest an intent to disregard the sound rule 
of public policy enunciated by this court in ·our Orloff and 
Stoumen decisions. 
The nature of the 1959 amendments, the past judicial inter-
pretation of the act, and the history of legislative action that 
extended the statutes' scope, indicate that identification of particu-
lar bases of discrimination - color, race, religion, ancestry, and 
national origin - added by the 1959 amendment, is illustrative 
rather than restrictive. Although the legislation has been invoked 
primarily by persons alleging discrimination on racial grounds, its 
language and its history compel the conclusion that the Legisla-
ture intended to prohibit all arbitrary discrimination by business 
establishments. 14 
141 
While it is clear that the court carefully considered the public interest, 
witnessed by the court's reliance on "public policy," the conclusion that 
the legislature intended the court to interpret the Unruh Act to cover the 
complaint of Mr. Cox rings a bit hollow. There was no direct evidence, 
such as legislative history, of such an intent on the part of the legislature. 
More likely, the legislature did not consider this issue at all. 
Given that the intent of the legislature was inadequately ascertainable, 
democratic consent theory, as developed in Part II of this article, would 
help to explain the decision in Cox. According to this theory, the judicia-
ry is fulfilling its most essential role when protecting the interests of the 
least powerful minorities. The court's interpretation of the Unruh Act 
would thus have much less to do with the intent of the legislature than 
with the court fulfilling its duty to the people of California. Additionally, 
progressive concepts, as developed in Part ill of this article, would argue 
for the Cox court's interpretation. The concepts of empowerment, human 
potential, self-esteem, and diversity all argue for broad and liberal inter-
pretation of anti-discrimination legislation. 
As illustrated above, courts do consider the public interest when 
interpreting statutes, and this is beneficial. Developing and deepening our 
understanding of the public interest is therefore valuable in reaching the 
best results in interpreting statutes. However, sometimes courts rely on an 
inadequate understanding of the public interest. By blindly applying tradi-
tional rules of statutory interpretation, they reach the wrong results. This 
is the case in Anderson v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration 
14. Cox, 3 Cal. 3d at 215-16 (citations omitted). 
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Anderson concerned interpretation of an ordinance authorizing San 
Francisco's residential rehabilitation loan program, commonly known as 
RAP (rehabilitation assistance program). The question was whether the 
RAP ordinance should be construed "to allow borrowers to pass through 
to tenants, under a prescribed rent formula, increased 'monthly rent 
payments' secured by the property at the time the loan [was] made, in-
cluding payments unrelated to the rehabilitation of the property." (em-
phasis added).16 The court held that the RAP ordinance, properly con-
strued, should allow landlords to pass through all loan payments to ten-
ants. According to the majority, the court was supposed to "construe 
ordinances by the same rules we apply to statutes. ,,17 Also according to 
the majority: "[T]he central question for us is whether the superior court 
correctly interpreted the term 'monthly loan payments' as restricting 
pass-throughs [in the rent charged] to rehabilitation-related loans. ,,18 
In addition to presenting the issue of interpreting statutory language 
at the time it was written, this case also presents the issue of changed 
circumstances. In this situation, Judge Posner argues we should "imagina-
tively reconstruct" the intent of the enacting legislature. After San Fran-
cisco authorized the RAP program, the Board of Supervisors enacted a 
rent control ordinance. According to the majority of the Anderson court, 
"we have to remember that in 1974, when RAP came into existence, 
there was no city-wide rent control. A landlord could pass on as much 
debt service as the market allowed."19 It is also a political reality that 
the 1974 Board of Supervisors would not have voted for any rent control, 
while the 1987 Board supported the ordinance in effect at the time.20 
In interpreting the RAP ordinance, the court did not consider the 
presumption, posited by consent theory, that statutes should be construed 
to protect the poor and least powerful. Nor did the court follow progres-
sive concepts that would have required it to interpret the ordinance to 
protect the diversity of San Francisco neighborhoods. 
Yet both of these ideas were part of the policies in the RAP ordi-
nance. According to the ordinance, the general purpose was "to improve 
the condition of housing and the quality of life in San Francisco . . . . It 
shall be the policy of RAP to maintain the existing diversity of San 
Francisco's neighborhoods, to encourage the existence of low and moder-
15. Anderson, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1338. 
16. 1d. 
17. 1d. at 1343. 
18. 1d. at 1342. 
19. 1d. at 1346. 
20. Interview with Supervisor Harry G. Britt, president of San Francisco Board of 
Supervisors (November 1988). 
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ate income housing. ,,21 The state authorizing statute stated: "[T]he local 
agency shall take every possible action to prevent displacement of all 
residents as a result of the operation of the residential rehabilitation pro-
gram.,,22 Additionally, landlord borrowers could "buyout" of the RAP 
rent limitations by prepaying the loan, or if the base rents were unreason-
ably low, petition the administrator for an increase. 23 
The result of the Anderson court's decision was absurd. According to 
the dissent, "By participating in the RAP program [landlords] are free to 
precipitously raise rents to whatever level is necessary to shift to their 
tenants the burden of repaying as much debt as their property will secure, 
regardless of the purpose for which the borrowed funds were obtained or 
used." Under the majority's interpretation, "all a RAP borrower's personal 
credit expenses, such as the repayment of an automobile [Mercedes-Benz] 
loan could be passed through to tenants.,,24 
Making matters worse, the later-enacted rent control statute gave 
landlords a strong incentive to mortgage to the hilt and take out a RAP 
loan. Thus, they could institute rent increases far beyond what would 
have been allowed by the rent control ordinance. Independent evidence 
confirms this. Two unappealed (but properly decided) cases "evidently in-
volved property owners who refInanced their property to the hilt just 
before taking out a RAP loan, planning to take advantage of the 
pass-through and perhaps to avoid the rent control ordinance.,,25 
InStead of relying on a properly developed concept of the public 
interest, the court relied on traditional rules of statutory interpretation that 
deserve to be questioned. The court relied in particular on "legislative 
intent," the "plain meaning" rule, and implicated the rule of expressio 
unius. The court reasoned: 
"The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the 
court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effec-
tuate the purpose of the law." "If the words of the statute are 
clear, the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a 
purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its 
legislative history. Certainly the court is not at liberty to seek 
hidden meanings not suggested by the statute or by the available 
extrinsic aids." 
The ordinance says that increased costs in the form of 
"monthly loan payments" can be passed on to the tenant after re-
21. Anderson, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1345. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 1353. 
24. Id. at 1352. 
25. Id. at 1342. 
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habilitation. The words are clear. Adding to them the limiting 
phrase "to fmance rehabilitation" is permitted only if the ordi-
nance, its legislative history or available extrinsic evidence re-
quires it. 26 
Even on the basis of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, the 
right decision could have been reached. However, the court's refusal to 
make relevant and helpful inquiries into the public interest made it much 
easier for the court to arrive at the wrong decision. 
As far as ascertaining legislative intent, I would prefer Judge Posner's 
"imaginative reconstruction" to the purposeful blindness of the Anderson 
majority. The majority argued that since the Board of Supervisors intend-
ed for RAP landlords to be able to pass-through all loan payments (there 
was no question at the time that they could pass-through all non-RAP-
related loans), we should consider that to be the intent of the Board even 
though the rent control ordinance would normally not permit such 
pass-throughs. Posner's "imaginative reconstruction" would at least ask 
that we mentally reconstitute the old Board and ask it whether, in light of 
the loophole that RAP could create in rent control, unrelated loan 
pass-throughs should be allowed. However, given that the Board that 
enacted RAP was hostile to rent control, the answer might still be yes. I 
would certainly prefer to look to the intent of the later board that enacted 
the related rent control ordinance. But I would feel most comfortable 
asking in what way the public interest would best be served, doing my 
best to ascertain as much information as possible about the potential 
. effects of various interpretations. If the current Board of Supervisors 
disagreed, it could change the statute based on the information available. 
V. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 
Unfortunately, after twenty years of beneficial results, the California 
Supreme Court has turned its back on its interpretation of the Unruh Act 
in In re Cox. As argued in Part IV, the public interest was well served by 
the interpretation of the In re Cox court. Harris v. Capitol Growth Inves-
tors XIJft7 reverses this interpretation and is another example of a "bad" 
interpretation. 
Harris v. Capitol Growth Investors also illustrates how a public inter-
est standard in statutory interpretation can gain increased protection for 
the rights of women. The plaintiffs in Harris, Muriel Jordan and Tamela 
Harris, were female heads of low-income families whose income consist-
26. [d. at 1344 (citations omitted). 
27. Tamela Harris v. Capitol Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 1142 (1991). 
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ed solely of public assistance benefits. They represented a class challeng-
ing Capitol Growth Investors' requirement that prospective tenants show 
that their gross "earned income" be equal to or greater than three times 
the rent. The plaintiffs complained that this selection method was arbi-
trary under the Unruh Act because although they could not meet the 
requirement, they were fmancially able to pay the rent. 
The record in the lower courts demonstrates that this policy was 
aimed particularly at excluding women on AFDC. The "earned income" 
policy was especially blatant because whether the income came from 
work, a trust fund, pension benefits, or AFDC, the color of the money 
was equally green. The requirement had virtually nothing to do with the 
tenant's ability to pay. The "gross income" requirement (although not 
argued in the lower courts) also had the effect of excluding a certain 
number of people on public assistance. The landlord's concern about 
ability to pay would have been much better effected by examining dis-
posable (after-tax) income. This is significant because many forms of 
public assistance are non-taxable. 
The main issue, as the case worked its way through the system, was 
the requirement of "three times rent." Because the case was decided on 
demurrer, the landlords conceded that the plaintiffs themselves may have 
had the fmancial ability to pay the rent. However, the landlords argued 
that this requirement was a valid predictive mechanism, and therefore rea-
sonable as a matter of law. The trial court agreed with the landlords on 
the "three times rent" requirement and with the plaintiffs on the "earned 
income" requirement. The landlords then agreed to drop the "earned 
income" requirement, so that on appeal the only issue presented was the 
"three times rent" requirement. 
The Court of Appeal, following In re Cox and its numerous progeny 
(all holding that the Unruh Act applied to all arbitrary discrimination), 
correctly reversed. The court held that the reasonableness of a three times 
rent requirement was a factual question and could not be decided on 
demurrer. More to the point in this case, the landlords had not demon-
strated that tenants who earned more than three times rent were any more 
reliable than tenants who earned less. Under the Court of Appeal ruling, 
the plaintiffs could have argued that there were much better ways of 
screening out irresponsible tenants, including prior rental history. 28 
The California Supreme Court rejected the decision of the Court of 
Appeal, significantly limiting the scope of the Unruh Act. While not 
overruling the specific holdings of In re Cox and its progeny, the court 
disagreed with the interpretation that the Unruh Act applied to all arbi-
28. See Harris v. Capitol Growth Investors XIV, 224 Cal. App. 3d 367 (1989), 
overruled by 52 Cal. 3d 1142 (1991). 
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trary discrimination. 29 The Harris court reached this holding even 
though the broad interpretation had been applied for twenty years, and the 
legislature had amended the statute a number of times without trying to 
change that interpretation. In fact, legislative history showed that when 
the statute was amended, some legislators voted for the amendments only 
after being assured that they would not affect the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation.3O 
The court used the traditional doctrine of ejusdem generis (general 
words following an enumeration refer to that enumeration) in a highly 
questionable manner. The court found that there was a common element 
between the classes listed in the statutes and those classes subsequent 
court decisions held to be covered under the Act. The court concluded 
that the Unruh Act, though not limited to the specific classes enumerated, 
was limited to discrimination based on "personal characteristics." While it 
is not particularly clear what this means, the court was very clear that it 
does not include discrimination based on income. (How having long hair 
is a "personal characteristic" while being poor is not is beyond my com-
prehension). 
Harris v. Capitol Growth Investors vividly illustrates the need to 
adopt a public interest standard in statutory interpretation and how adopt-
ing such a standard allows the concerns of women to be heard by the 
legal system. The Unruh Act specifically bans discrimination based on 
sex. In our current socioeconomic system, however, laws banning facial 
discrimination do not protect the needs of women. 
Since women, and particularly women with children, are more likely 
than other segments of society to be poor and disempowered, general 
interpretations that benefit the poor and unpopular redound to the benefit 
of women. Because the In re Cox court properly interpreted the Unruh 
Act to ban all arbitrary discrimination, the court of appeal felt compelled 
to give Muriel Jordan and Tamela Harris a hearing. Unfortunately, the 
current California Supreme Court ignored not only progressive concepts 
based on the public interest but also traditional doctrines such as stare 
de'cisis and legislative ratification. Instead, using even more questionable 
"traditional tools" of statutory interpretation, the court abandoned the 
sound rule of public policy announced by the In re Cox court, denying 
Muriel Jordan, Tamela Harris, and many other women in similar situa-
tions the chance to fmd decent housing. 
29. Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1148. 
30. See Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1178 n.l (Broussard J., dissenting). 
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CONCLUSION 
Judges should, within the constraints of their power, interpret statutes 
to best serve the public interest. Reference to democratic theory and 
progressive concepts can help better to ascertain the public interest in 
difficult cases of statutory interpretation. While, in general, courts ade-
quately ascertain the public interest through traditional principles, there is 
much room for improvement. Continued questioning can help make that 
improvement possible. 
Using a public interest standard can help increase the rights of wom-
en. Examining women's concerns can be a valuable method of ascertain-
ing the quality of consent within the system. Since women's voices have 
previously been excluded from the legal profession, it is clear that major 
improvements in consent can be made by developing legal theory that is 
consistent with the concerns of women. The concerns of women are 
similar in this way to the concerns of all disempowered groups within our 
society. A theory of interpretation that incorporates the concerns of wom-
en should provide strong compatibility with the needs of other 
disempowered groups and even help provide better dispute resolution in 
the typical male v. male context. I believe that a public interest standard 
for statutory interpretation provides this compatibility within the frame-
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